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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a portion of a circuit court judgment
which resolved all claims between the parties, and from the
court's denial of a motion to reconsider.

Rule 54(b) is not at

issue.
Pacific Bay timely filed its notice of appeal following the
trial court's denial of its motion to reconsider.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (d) .
IV.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an appeal over attorney's fees.
G&K sued Pacific Bay for its alleged failure to make

payments on a lease, and for liquidated damages arising from
Pacific Bay's alleged premature termination of the contract.
After it stipulated to a partial judgment at tne outset of trial,
Pacific Bay prevailed on the claim which was actually tried.
However, the trial court awarded fees to G&K alone under the
parties' contract.
A.

ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court err in finding the "net judgment

rule" dispositive of this case?
2.

Did the trial court err in not awarding Pacific Bay any

fees, when Pacific Bay defeated G&K :n the only claim tried, and
the parties' contract provided that fees would be awarded to the
successful party?
3.

Did the trial court err bv deciding that Pacific Bay

would be adequately compensated for its fees if the court simply

4

deducted an amount from G&K's award, when the law in any event
prevented G&K from recovering fees expended in its failure at
trial?
4.

Did the trial court err by not making specific findings

of fact concerning the fees awarded to G&K?
5.

If the law in Utah permits there to be only one

successful party in a lawsuit, regardless of the number of
discrete claims litigated therein, did the trial court err in
finding that G&K was that party when Pacific Bay prevailed on the
only claim tried?
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pacific Bay challenges none of the trial court's

factual findings, although in issue 4 Pacific Bay does challenge
the trial court's failure to make adequate findings.

G&K has not

filed a cross-appeal.
Factual findings are not in dispute.

This case thus

presents a question of law: did the trial court correctly apply
the law of attorney's fees to the circumstances before it?
This court reviews issues of law for correctness, affording
the lower court no deference.

Commercial Union Associates v.

Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993).

See also Barnard v.

Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (when record reveals no
factual disputes, court considers whether law was correctly
applied) . *
1

Several cases refer to reviewing fee awards for an "abuse of
discretion." See, e.g., Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy
Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982); Ouinn v. Ouinn (In re
Ouinn), 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah App. 1992). These cases,
(continued...)
5

V.

STATUTES AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, rules or

regulations applicable to
VI.

his appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

At issue is the interpretation of a contractual attorney's
fees provision.
G&K leases textiles.

Pacific Bay is a bakery.

G&K and

Pacific Bay entered into a contract under which G&K leased to
Pacific Bay sales uniforms and other work clothes.

G&K

ultimately sued Pacific Bay, alleging two contract claims.
First, G&K alleged that Pacific Bay had terminated the contract
prematurely, entitling G&K to liquidated damages.

Second, G&K

sought damages for Pacific Bay's alleged failure to pay for
services rendered.
At the outset of trial, Pacific Bay stipulated to judgment
in a sum certain on G&K's second claim, but stated it owed
nothing to G&K on the liquidated damages claim and would so
prove.

The parties then tried the liquidated damages claim and

several smaller issues involved in the open account claim.

1

(...continued)
however, almost always are directed to the issue of the award's
amount. But see Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085,
1988, cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989) ("[w]e conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion" by failing to enforce fee
clause of parties' contract).
Pacific Bay questions not the amount of fees awarded to G&K
(except insofar as such a challenge is indicated in issue 4 ) , but
instead the trial court's application of law--to now unchallenged
facts--in deciding who was entitled to an award.
6

At the conclusion of trial, the court found for Pacific Bay
on the liquidated damages claim and on all but one of the other
peripheral issues which were tried.

However, stating that it

felt bound to do so by the "net judgment rule" of Mountain States
Broadcasting v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1993), the court found that G&K was the
"prevailing party" and thus entitled to fees since it had
received an affirmative recovery through Pacific Bay's
stipulation to judgment.

The court declined to award Pacific Bay

any fees, although it did reduce the amount of fees G&K
requested.
Following trial, Pacific Bay moved for reconsideration on
the fee issue.
B.

The court denied the motion without comment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Neither party has challenged the facts as found by the trial
court or the legal conclusions reached by the court on G&K's
contract claims.

The crux of this appeal is instead the award of

attorney's fees which the court made as a result of the
conclusions it reached on G&K's claims.

Pacific Bay will thus

only briefly set forth the facts as adduced at trial.
The parties' entered into their contract on April 12, 1988.
A copy of the contract is attached to the complaint, Record, p.
5, and addendum to this brief ("Addendum"), Exhibit A.

Under the

contract, G&K leased sales uniforms and other work clothes to
Pacific Bay.
This litigation was set in motion on December 23, 1991.
that day, G&K refused to deliver uniforms and work clothes to

7
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Pacific Bay because Pacific Bay did not have a check ready for
G&K's driver.

Record, p. 270, Ins. 1-15.

As a result of G&K's

failure to deliver, Pacific Bay procured another uniform
supplier.

Record, p. 329, Ins. 22-23.

G&K then filed its

complaint, alleging that Pacific Bay had terminated the contract
early and thus was obligated to pay liquidated damages under the
contract.

G&K also sought payment for services rendered.2

Under the contract as written, payment was required on a
monthly basis.

However, in its opening statement Pacific Bay

stated it would prove that the contract had been modified by the
parties' course of performance to permit payment on a 60 day
term, that a check was not due G&K on December 23, 1991 under the
contract as modified, and that G&K's refusal to deliver on that
date was thus a breach of the contract which entitled Pacific Bay
to look elsewhere for uniforms.

Record, p. 222, Ins. 4-25; p.

223, Ins. 1-20.
At the outset of trial, Pacific Bay agreed that it owed G&K
$3,790.02 on account.

Record, p. 226, Ins. 24-25; p. 227, Ins.

1-13; p. 228, Ins. 3-7.

Pacific Bay disputed that it owed G&K

for the invoice representing the uniforms which G&K refused to
2

Pacific Bay first appeared pro se. When this case was
initially scheduled for trial, Pacific Bay did not appear. The
court then entered a default judgment. Pacific Bay retained
counsel, and moved to set aside the default on the grounds that
it did not receive notice of the trial and had meritorious
defenses. The trial court set aside the default, but required
Pacific Bay to pay G&K's fees in opposing the motion to set
aside, as well as its fees for trial preparation and appearance.
Record, p. 50.
Pacific Bay does not claim that setting aside a default
judgment is any great triumph. Nonetheless, G&K has now been
compensated twice for its lawyers' efforts.
8

deliver, and disputed the last invoice received from G&K on the
grounds that G&K had improperly computed depreciation for
uniforms which were not returned to it.

Record, p. 225, Ins. 1-

25; p. 226, Ins 1-4. As the court noted, the trial thus
"focus[ed] in" on the liquidated damages claim and the two
disputed invoices at issue in the claim for payment due.

Record,

p. 228, Ins. 8-11.
In support of its argument that the parties had modified the
payment terms of the contract through their course of dealing,
Pacific Bay testified that it consistently made payments on a 60
day cycle.

Record, p. 324, Ins. 12-16; p. 347, Ins. 11-24; p.

348, Ins. 1-9.

While G&K testified that it warned Pacific Bay by

telephone about being in arrears on the account, Record, p. 262,
Ins. 3-25; p. 263, Ins. 9-25, Pacific Bay testified otherwise.
Record, p. 354, Ins. 24-25; p. 355, Ins. 1-17.

The trial court

credited Pacific Bay's testimony on this issue and discounted
that of G&K.

Record, p. 387, Ins. 23-25; p. 388, Ins. 1-3; p.

397, Ins. 24-25; p. 398, Ins. 1-25; p. 399, Ins. 1-5.3
Save for the (discounted) testimony concerning the warnings
allegedly given Pacific Bay, the thrust of G&K's case at trial
went to establishing G&K's internal concerns over the Pacific Bay
account, which presumably supplied another basis for G&K's
refusal to deliver uniforms absent a check.
3

However, the trial

G&K also testified that a Pacific Bay check had been
returned for insufficient funds, allegedly further evidencing the
problems G&K claimed it had with the account. Record, p. 267,
Ins. 8-16. Pacific Bay's controller testified that no such check
existed in Pacific Bay's files. Record, p. 349, Ins. 19-25. The
trial court credited Pacific Bay's testimony. Record, p. 3 98,
Ins. 4-6.
9

court found it peculiar that for all of G&K's testimony about the
problems with Pacific Bay, G&K had adduced no written evidence at
trial documenting these concerns, including any correspondence
with Pacific Bay on the issue.

Record, p. 386, In. 25; p. 387,

Ins. 1-13; p. 398, Ins. 13-25; 399, Ins. 1-5.
As a result of the testimony and other evidence received at
trial, the court accepted Pacific Bay's position, finding that
G&K had acquiesced in a 60 day payment term, and that the
parties7 course of performance modified the contract to provide
for such a term.

Record, p. 397, Ins. 5-10; Ins 20-23.

The

court therefore found, again agreeing with Pacific Bay, that G&K
terminated the contract early by demanding payment when it was
not due, Record, p. 3 99, Ins. 6-10, and that as the terminating
party G&K had no claim for liquidated damages.
Ins. 6-10.

Record, p. 339,

The Court also found that G&K was not entitled to

payment for the goods which G&K did not deliver, since, while G&K
attempted to deliver the goods again a week following its refusal
first to deliver, G&K had already breached the contract by then.
Record, p. 400, In. 25; p. 401, Ins. 1-9.
At trial, the court found for G&K only on one portion of one
of the disputed invoices.

In particular, the court found as fact

that Pacific Bay had not returned certain uniforms to G&K, and
thus had been properly charged for those uniforms.
400, Ins. 16-21.

Record, p.

However, even on this issue the court agreed

with Pacific Bay that G&K had improperly depreciated the
unreturned uniforms, Record, p. 383, Ins. 20-25, p. 384, Ins. 114, and that G&K was to follow the method "most beneficial

10

towards the defense."

Id. at 384, Ins. 12-14, p. 399, Ins. 16-

25; p. 400, Ins. 1-15.
The trial court thus ruled for Pacific Bay on all but one
issue which was actually tried.

Most importantly, the court

found for Pacific Bay on the entire liquidated damages claim, the
testimony and argument on which consumes 114 pages of the
reporter's transcript.4

The court nonetheless found that under

Mountain States Broadcasting, G&K was the prevailing party in the
litigation since it had received a "net judgment", and thus G&K,
but not Pacific Bay, was entitled to fees under the parties'
contract.

Record, p. 401, Ins. 19-20; p. 402, Ins. 6-10, 23-25;

p. 403, Ins. 1-10, p. 407, Ins. 1-12.

Acknowledging that Pacific

Bay prevailed on what the court termed "some issues", the court
did reduce G&K's fee request from $2,080.00 to $1,450.00, stating
that it was "apportioning" fees.

Record, p. 403, Ins. 11-25; p.

404, Ins. 1-12.
In making its award, the court stated that Pacific Bay's
victory was not worth much in comparison to the stipulated
judgment, Record, p. 401, Ins. 24-25; p. 402, Ins. 1-6,
emphasized that Pacific Bay had not made an offer of judgment
before trial, and noted that Pacific Bay sought to vacate the
whole default judgment early on in the case, not simply the
liquidated damages portion.

Record, p. 402, Ins. 11-22.

4

Record, pp. 221-224, 228-247, 251-252, 254-282, 284-299,
308-310, 322-349, 354-357, 360-367, 373-380, 381, 388-396. The
remainder of the time was spent on the invoice for undelivered
goods, upon which Pacific Bay prevailed, on the issue of
depreciation, upon which Pacific Bay prevailed, and on the issue
of which uniforms were returned, upon which G&K prevailed.
11

The court's decision on attorney's fees was the subject of
extensive colloquy between the court and counsel, during which
the point was preserved.

Record, p. 371, In. 25; p. 372, p. 373,

Ins. 1-8; p. 405, Ins. 15-25; p. 406, p. 407, Ins. 1-12.
The trial court's rulings at the conclusion of trial are
summarized as follows in its findings and conclusions, at Record,
p. 134 and Addendum, Exhibit B:5
Findings of Fact

4.
For approximately three years . . . G&K continued
to honor its end of the contract while accepting payments
from Pacific Bay on an approximately 60-day term basis
contrary to the provisions of the contract.
5.
G&K's acquiescence in allowing Pacific Bay to
establish a long record of payments for a term longer than
specified in the contract constituted a course of
performance.

6.
Pacific Bay did not provide a check on December 23
or 24 because G&K prematurely demanded payment for previous
services when such payment was not yet due.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

6.
As a result of the parties' course of performance
over the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, the payment terms
pursuant to the contract were modified from a net-10 term
where payment was due on the tenth of the next month to a
net-60 day term where the amounts owing were due sixty days
later. This course of performance which modified the
contract under the Uniform Commercial Code, was of the
nature where the defendant would pay a month's worth of
invoices sixty days after the last invoice in that month.
When plaintiff prematurely demanded payment on December 23rd
and failed to deliver the goods it breached its contract

A copy of the judgment is included in the Addendum as
Exhibit C.
12

with defendant, and they are not entitled to collect
liquidated damages otherwise provided for in the contract.
7.
However, plaintiffs are entitled as the prevailing
party in this action to compensation for their attorneys'
fees and costs.
Following trial, Pacific Bay filed a motion for alteration
or amendment of the judgment, Record, p. 75, and supporting
memorandum, id., p. 77, again arguing that it was entitled to
fees for work done in defeating G&K's claim for liquidated
damages, and resubmitting its affidavits, which showed that
Pacific Bay's fees were devoted entirely to issues on which
Pacific Bay succeeded at trial, including time spent researching
the law of course of performance, drafting a trial brief, and
preparing for trial.

Record, pp. 87-92.

After G&K responded,

Record, p. 124, and Pacific Bay replied, id., p. 146, the court
denied the motion without comment.

Record, p. 160.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. The trial court erroneously found that Mountain States
Broadcastincr Co. v. Neale supplies the rule of decision in this
case.
B.

Because it fully prevailed on the major contested claim

at trial, Pacific Bay is entitled to its fees for the time spent
in preparation for and participation at trial, regardless of
whether G&K is entitled to fees.
C.

G&K, like any litigant, was not entitled to fees

attributable to its failure at trial.

The trial court's

reduction of G&K's fees as a means of acknowledging Pacific Bay's
success at trial did not provide Pacific Bay that to which it is
entitled, but instead only effected a reduction which under the
13

law was not optional.

The court was obligated to award Pacific

Bay fees for its success a trial, regardless of any cut made to
G&K's fees.
D.

The trial court erred in not making specific findings

and conclusions concerning the amount of fees awarded to G&K.
E.

To the extent Utah law permits there to be only one

"successful party", the trial court erred in ruling that G&K was
that party.
VIII.

ARGUMENT
Conclusion of Law no. 6 carefully details G&K's breach of

the contract.

Under Conclusion of Law no. 7, "however", G&K (and

implicitly, G&K alone) is entitled to fees.

"However" serves its

qualifying purpose well here, for the court's rulings on the
substantive claim at trial is at loggerheads with its subsequent
refusal to award Pacific Bay any fees.
A.

The Net Judgment Rule does not Control this Case.

While it did not set them forth under separate headings in
its complaint, G&K alleged two breach of contract claims against
Pacific Bay.

The first sought liquidated damages arising from

Pacific Bay's alleged premature termination of the contract.

The

second demanded payment for services.
Although Pacific Bay prevailed in toto on the liquidated
damages claim--the only claim tried--the trial court concluded
that the "net judgment" (which was the result of a stipulation)
was in G&K's favor, and thus G&K--but not Pacific Bay--was
entitled to fees under Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale.
On this point, the court erred as a matter of law.

14

In Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1993), this Court noted that the Mountain
States net judgment rule is "disfavored".

Id. at 155, n. 10.

In

Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah
App. 1990), the Court declined to follow the Mountain States net
judgment rule on facts similar to those at bar.
In Occidental/Nebraska, the parties disputed which of two
trust deed foreclosure sales was valid.

The defendants argued

that the first sale controlled the amount of deficiency and
stipulated to that amount at trial.

The plaintiff urged that the

first sale was defective, and thus that the much higher
deficiency established at the second sale controlled.

The

defendants prevailed on the "validity" issue and hence suffered
judgment only in the amount to which they stipulated.

The trial

court awarded the defendants fees as the prevailing party.
bank appealed.

The

This Court summarized the dispute:

Occidental contends that because a judgment was entered in
its favor, it is the prevailing party in this lawsuit and
should collect fees. The Mehrs, on the other hand, argue
that, while a judgment was entered against them, they
prevailed on the only contested issue at trial, i.e., the
validity of the first trustee's sale.
Id. at 221.

After noting the "particular facts" of Mountain

States, id. , the Court of Appeals summarized Utah law on
attorney's fees:
Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts
have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to
those claims on which the party was successful. See
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at] 566 n. 10 (reasonable fee
excludes amounts attributable to issues or claims on which
party otherwise entitle to fee was unsuccessful); Stacey
Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (defendant was entitled to attorney fees on the
15

counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his
successful defense of plaintiff's attempt to accelerate a
promissory note), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989);
see also Graco F:-hing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood
Exploration, Inc. 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of
attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those
fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims).
Noting 1) that the defendants had stipulated before trial that
they owed the bank $7,300 (the deficiency from the first sale),
and 2) that the trial itself thus centered on the issue of which
sale was valid, the court held that fees and costs had properly
been awarded to the defendants since they prevailed on the "only
contested issue at trial", i.e., whether the deficiency would be
based on first or second sale.

Id. at 221-222.

Pacific Bay agreed at the outset of trial that it owed G&K a
certain amount, but no more

Pacific Bay then defeated G&K on

the only contested claim tried.

Mountain States does not control

this case.
B.

Regardless of Whether G&K is Entitled to Fees, Pacific
Bay is Entitled to Fees for Successfully Defending
Against G&K's Claim for Liquidated Damages.

Under Occidental, a party is not disenfranchised from
receiving fees simply because its success is measured by the
extent of a claim defeated rather than a judgment received.
While Occidental does not specifically address the issue, a
defendant (such as Pacific Bay) remains entitled to fees for a
successful defense against a claim even when the plaintiff
prevails on a different claim.
Modern rules of procedure permit liberal joinder of claims.
Utah.R.Civ.P. 18.
rule.

Thus, multiple-claim actirns are today the

CiL_ Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1987)

16

(discussing rigid terminology and limitations at common law
governing counterclaim practice).
A party may prevail on some but not all claims alleged.
When this occurs, each party is awarded fees commensurate with
its success.

See Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah

1984) (per curiam) (where each party was successful on one or
more points and unsuccessful on others, the trial court erred in
applying "net judgment" rule to award fees only to plaintiffs)6;
Brown v. Richards, supra, 840 P.2d at 154, n.10 (dicta; "both
parties are entitled to fees when both parties are successful in
enforcing different provisions of a contract against the other").
Citing Elder v. Triax Co., supra, 740 P.2d 1320, 1321-22
(Utah 1987), Mountain States itself left open the opportunity for
an award of fees when each party prevails on different claims,
albeit in the context of claim versus counterclaim.

Mountain

States, 783 P.2d at 556 n. 8.
In Triax, the plaintiff, a prime contractor, sued a
subcontractor under a contract which provided for fees.

The

subcontractor denied liability and asserted permissive
counterclaims arising from different contracts between the
parties.
The subcontractor further argued that the prime was not
entitled to fees until the sub's counterclaim was resolved,
citing several older cases which hold that fees under a note
cannot be awarded until counterclaims are resolved, since only

6

Brown cites Trayner (along with two other cases) as being in
conflict with the net judgment rule of Mountain States. Brown,
840 P.2d at 154 n. 10.
17

then would accounts between the parties be settled.
1321.

74 0 P.2d at

The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, noting that these cases

made sense only because early pleading rules required a
"counterclaim" both to arise from the same transaction as the
affirmative claim and to diminish or defeat the affirmative
claim.

Id. at 1322.

Echoing Holmes' dictum, the court concluded

that historical terminology alone was the only justification for
denying the plaintiff fees pending resolution of unrelated
counterclaims, since such counterclaims would not affect the
plaintiff's claim.

Id.

Triax thus indicates that success or failure at litigation-and thus fees--may be apportioned among discrete claims, although
the case dealt with counterclaims.

In a case nearly identical on

its issues to the one at bar, the Washington Court of Appeals has
recently taken the next step, addressing the question of who is
entitled to fees when the plaintiff has alleged more than one
claim but no counterclaim is raised.
In Marassi v. Lau, 859 P.2d 605 (Wash. App. 1993), the
plaintiffs dismissed 5 of the 12 claims of their complaint prior
to trial, and then received an affirmative judgment on 2 of the 7
claims tried.

859 P.2d at 606.

Although Dynasty, the defendant,

thus successfully defended against the five remaining claims, the
court awarded fees to the plaintiffs as the "prevailing party"
under the parties' contract.

Id.

The appellate court reversed.

The court first noted that under the general rules
governing fee awards, a "prevailing party" normally is one who
receives an affirmative judgment, and that if neither party

18

wholly prevails then the party who "substantially prevails" is
entitled to fees.

859 P.2d at 606-07.

However,

lf

[t]hese general

principles, . . . do not address situations in which a defendant
has not made a counterclaim for affirmative relief, but merely
defends against the plaintiff's claims."

Id. at 607.

In

particular, the court held that the "net affirmative judgment
rule" or the "substantially prevailing rule" yielded neither a
fair nor just result in the case before it, since Dynasty
successfully defended against a majority of claims at trial.

Id.

at 608.
The court concluded that "when the alleged contract breaches
at issue consist of several distinct and severable claims, a
proportionality approach is more appropriate."

Id. at 608.

Under this approach, each party is entitled to fees upon those
claims on which it prevailed.

By awarding fees to defendants who

succeed on particular claims, the courts thus serve the purposes
of fee shifting: to discourage weak cases, encourage settlements,
and restore a wronged party to original position.

Id.

Similarly, Florida's well-developed body of law governing
fees is consistent with Marassi and the developing trend of Utah
law.
In response to a question certified to it by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida
Supreme Court, in Folta v. Bolton, 493 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1986),
rejected what it termed the "net winner rule" in multiple claim
cases in favor determining entitlement to fees on a claim by
claim basis.

4 93 So.2d at 442-43.
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Thus, the defendant was

entitled to fees expended on claims successfully defended
against.

Id. at 443.

See also Consolidated Southern Security,

Inc. v. Geniac & Assoc^., Inc., 619 So.2d 1027 (Fla. App. 1993)
(trial court improperly attempted to "net out" from plaintiff's
fee award the amount of time plaintiff's counsel spent on
unsuccessful claim; under Folta, court should have instead
accounted for time defendant spent in successful defense of the
same claim); Park Lane Condominium Ass'n v. DePadua, 558 So.2d 85
(Fla. App. 1990) (trial court erred under Folta in not awarding
fees on a claim by claim basis, with defendant entitled to fees
for claims successfully defended against).
Triax, Brown, Marassi and Folta recognize that lawsuits are
often made up of several distinct claims.

Although Triax dealt

with a counterclaim, Marassi and Folta take the next logical
step, acknowledging that a defendant who does not counterclaim is
no less entitled to fees for successfully fending off a claim
than a defendant who prevails on a counterclaim.
G&K's complaint alleged two distinct contract claims.
first sought liquidated damages.
services rendered.
facts.

The

The second was a claim for

These claims arose from completely different

Pacific Bay's stipulation at the outset of trial on the

open account claim had no effect on the liquidated damages claim.
The claims could have been tried separately without effect on
either one.
Pacific Bay fully prevailed on the claim for liquidated
damages, and was thus the "successful party" thereon.
consumed the majority of trial time.

20

This claim

This is not a case where

Pacific Bay claims victory by virtue of whittling down G&K's
claim for damages.

Cf. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d at 155

(defendant does not prevail on claim if his only success is to
reduce damages awarded on claim).

Instead, Pacific Bay claims

victory on an entire claim, and has proved G&K the wrongdoer with
respect to that claim.

See Brown, 840 P.2d at 155 ("It is the

determination of culpability, not the amount of damages, that
determines who is the prevailing party."); Marassi, 859 P.2d at
608 (permitting defendant to recover fees will discourage weak
claims and restore party to its original position).
In addition to citing the net judgment rule, the trial court
suggested several reasons for why it did not award Pacific Bay
any fees.

These reasons are irrelevant under the law.

The court believed that Pacific Bay's victory was not worth
much.

A claim's dollar value is not the arbiter of whether fees

are to be awarded.

See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d at 155 (trial

court erred in not awarding fees to defendant for successful
defense, even if the claim was only a minor part of the
lawsuit).7
The court was also piqued at Pacific Bay for not earlier
paying G&K what Pacific Bay agreed at the outset of trial that it
owed.

In response, Pacific Bay argued that it did not pay G&K

earlier because it wished to resolve the whole dispute at once,

7

Neither claim of this case involved significant sums. G&K
was awarded judgment on its account claim in the amount of
$4,575.21, and was denied recovery of the almost $2,000 in
liquidated damages which it sought. The trial court's
characterization of Pacific Bay's success as not worth much thus
appears inaccurate in light of the total amount in controversy.
21

including the liquidated damages claim.
23.

Record, p. 3 72, Ins. 16-

Pacific Bay believed it had been treated improperly by G&K

(as was borne out by trial), and was not of a mind to settle a
portion of the case while G&K kept up its demands for liquidated
damages.

Pacific Bay does not believe its behavior was unusual

or unexpected for a defendant.

Regardless, Pacific Bay did not

curtail its right to fees by not settling up with G&K until the
whole case could be resolved.
The court also indicated that its decision on fees might
have been different had Pacific Bay made an offer of judgment.
The court's reasoning on this latter point is unclear, since
offers of judgment under Rule 68 entitle the party offering
judgment to costs--but not fees--in the event additional monies
are not recovered.
1978).

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah

See also Marassi v. Lau, 859 P.2d at 608 n. 6 (offer of

judgment rule was not at issue in case).

Pacific Bay's failure

to make an offer of judgment is not relevant to whether it is
entitled to fees.
C.

The Trial Court's Decision to Reduce G&K's Fees Rather
than Award Pacific Bay Fees does not Satisfy the Law or
Contract.

Acknowledging that Pacific Bay prevailed on what it termed
"some issues", the court reduced G&K's fee request from $2,080.00
to $1,450.00, stating that it was "apportioning" fees.
was not apportioning fees at all.

The court

Apportionment is what Pacific

Bay now seeks.
G&K, like any litigant, was never entitled to fees
attributable to its failure at trial.
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See infra, § D.

By

docking G&K's fee request, the court thus did only what the law
already required.

What the trial court did not do, however, was

award Pacific Bay the fees attributable to its success at trial
on an entire claim, not simply an "issue."

This was error.

See

Consolidated Southern Security, Inc. v. Geniac & Assoc's., Inc.,
619 So.2d 1027 (Fla. App. 1993) (trial court improperly attempted
to "net out" from plaintiff's fee award the amount of time
plaintiff's counsel spent on unsuccessful claim; court should
have instead accounted for time defendant spent in successful
defense of the same claim).
Irrespective of the mandatory reduction made to G&K's
request, the trial court was obligated to award Pacific Bay the
fees incurred in its success at trial.
D.

The Trial Court did not Make Sufficient Findings
Concerning G&K's Fees.

Although the court reduced G&K's fees, it made no findings
concerning the amount of fees to which G&K was properly entitled.
This was error.
G&K is not entitled to fees for the time it spent
unsuccessfully litigating issues.8

Mountain States notes that "a

reasonable fee will compensate [the litigant] only for those fees
necessarily incurred in resolution of issues in [the litigant's]
favor, and should not include fees relating to the issues

8

Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per
curiam); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d
1279, 1288 (Utah 1982); Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 171
(Utah 1977); Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (1989); Graco
Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766
P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988).
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resolved in [the other litigant's] favor."

783 P.2d at 556 n.10

(emphasis added) .9
Unlike those of Pacific Bay, G&K's labors at trial were
almost completely unsuccessful.

G&K is not entitled to fees for

time spent at trial or in preparation for trial (and has already
been paid once for such efforts) .10 Although the court properly
cut G&K's fees, it erroneously made no findings concerning the
amount of fees to which G&K was entitled.
E.

If Utah law Still Permits there to be Only One
Successful Party Regardless of the Number of Claims
Pled, Pacific Bay was that Party.

Under our modern rules of procedure, attorney's fees should
be awarded on a claim by claim basis.
with such a rule.

Utah law is consistent

If, however, the Court believes there can be

only one successful party even in a multiple claim action, that
party was Pacific Bay.
Like the defendant in Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Mehr, Pacific Bay prevailed on the only claim actually litigated
after it stipulated to an amount certain.

The net judgment rule

does not properly account for the posture of this case.

See

Mountain States, 783 P.2d 556 n. 7 (acknowledging that rule is
not universally applicable).

9

See also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood
Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of
attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees
attributable to the pursuit of successful claims); Brown v.
Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court must
make findings concerning fees attributable to claims on which
party succeeded at trial). Here, none of G&K's fees are
attributable to a success at trial.
10

See note 2, supra.
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F.

Pacific Bay is Entitled to Recover Fees on Appeal if it
is Successful.

If the contract permits recovery of fees in the trial court,
as a matter of law it also permits recovery of fees on appeal.
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d
406, 409 (Utah 1980).

If Pacific Bay prevails on appeal, it will

thus be entitled to fees expended thereon.
IX.

CONCLUSION
In denying Pacific Bay its fees, the trial court erred as a

matter of law.

The court's judgment on fees should be reversed.

DATED this \&

day of May, 1994.

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae

Mark W.\ Dykes
Counsel\for) Pacific Bay

Baking Cotnpany
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Opening
Brief of Defendant/Appellant Pacific Bay Baking Company was
served this 18th day of May, 1994, by depositing same in the
United States mails, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to
the following:
Theodore E. Kanell
Daniel L. Steele
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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DANIEL L. STEELE, Bar No. 6336
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
G & K SERVICES, INC., a
Corporation,

1

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v*

Civil No. 920002083CV

PACIFIC BAY BAKING, a
Utah corporation,

Judge Michael L. Hutchings

Defendant.
The Court, having heard evidence at trial on November 2 and
3, 1993 and otherwise being

fully advised

in the premises

following the bench trial on those dates, wherein all parties were
present and represented by counsel;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff is
awarded judgment against the defendant in the amount of $4,575.21
as due on account, plus $1,427.62 as prejudgment interest at the
rate of 18 percent as called for in the contract between the
parties, plus $1,450.00 in reasonable attorneys' fees as provided
for in the contract, plus $93.00 in costs, for a total judgment of

$7,545.83.

This amount is now due and payable and is further

subject to post-judgment interest at the contract rate of 18
percent per annum for all amounts owing and unpaid upon entry of
this judgment.
Dated this

n

/ / day of

'MICHAEL L. HDTCHINGS
Third Circuit Court Judge
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THEODORE E. KANELL, Bar No. 1768
DANIEL L. STEELE, Bar No. 6336
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
G & K SERVICES, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

1
i
i

FINDINGS 0/ FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Revised)

v.

Civil Noy920002083CV

PACIFIC BAY BAKING, a
Utah corporation,

Judge Michael L. Hutchings

Defendant•
The trial, having come on regularly before this Court on
November 2, 1993 from 9:30 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. and on November
3, 1993 from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., with plaintiffs represented
by Theodore E. Kanell and Daniel L. Steele of Hanson, Epperson &
Smith and defendants represented by Mark Dykes and Steven Strong,
and the Court having heard all evidence and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises hereby enters the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law.

'JS

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff G & K and defendant Pacific Bay were parties

to a valid contract wherein G & K was obligated to provide Pacific
Bay with goods and services including uniforms and laundry and
linen supplies.
2.

Pacific Bay was in turn obligated to pay for these

services pursuant to the terms of the contract*
3.

The original terms of the contract called for net ten

payment term, meaning payment for goods and services rendered
would be due on the tenth of the next month.
4.

For approximately three years however, G & K continued

to honor its end of the contract while accepting payments from
Pacific Bay on an approximately 60-day term basis contrary to the
provisions of the contract.
5.

G

& K's

acquiescence

in

allowing

Pacific

Bay to

establish a long record of payments for a term longer than
specified in the contract constituted a course of performance.
6.

Thereafter, G & K attempted to deliver supplies to

Pacific Bay on December 23 or 24 as required by the contract but
since no check for payment was presented they did not deliver.
7.

Pacific Bay did not provide a check on December 23 or 24

because G & K prematurely demanded payment for previous services
when such payment was not yet due.
8.

Thereafter defendant informed plaintiff that it had

retained the services of another supplier and would no longer need

/3S

the services of G ' F.
9.
" i l l I1 I

On January

Il I III

1992, plaintiff and its representatives

I III I Mil

search reclaiming

~s goods then in the possession of t

defendant and noting all lost goods which were
. '

"Il li ni b mi ni ni i iiil 11 ni I, mi I mi mi I I ( i I ni ill

returned

ni b a l a n c

represents the value ot the goods lost m

then in possession

the defendant and not returned less depreciation of JJ percent
^ontrac
10.

s.

The Court finds that there Is, by stipulation, owing

$3,790.02.

This amount represents amounts owing

November and December

October,

but not including the December 24th and

31st invoices.
1

Court finds tha

stipulated

plaintiff :i s entitled to recover $785.19, which

represents the depreciated amount owed on the January 27th invoice
for unreturned merchandise.
12.

amount ~4 $4,575.21

These amounts resulted

which Defendants owed Plaintiff.
13.

Defendant has

I

ilnlr

triileii

II

M M \\ II I n 1

iniii iiiiiiiill i

l i 1 1 • • 111 il

owing for the invoices as totaled above.
14.

The October invoices totalling $1,573.90 which defendant

1
28,

ecember
1991.
-3-

S3£>

1c

The

lovember

defendant has stipulated

invoices
—

totalling

$lf307.49

which

owing, were due for payment on or

The December invoices totalling $908.63, excepting the
December 24th and 31st invoices, which defendant has stipulated to

Plaintiff cannot collect for the December 24th and 31 ; .1 ,
invoices because they failed to deliver the goods stated therein.
Januar^
March

amount ::: £ $ 3 85.

1 9 w as due ^>n or before

, 1992.
19.

I I

Plaintiffs were forced tc • i n :i t i a t e

J ega II j: i: Dceed :i ngs I: ::

i i I f.'h" amounts and showed up at trial prepared and w i l l i n g

to p r o s e c u t e all of i ts claims including the amounts stipulated to
by d e f e n d a n t .
20.

1 11 in. i i i

j s ent-i •

mterest

percent

per

annum as provided by the contract for the stipulated amounts and
for the January 27 th amount.

Thi u I'I'^IPHI

I. 'J1.

sha ' >

modified due date forward to judgment.
21.

Interest

on the October amounts past due

m o n t h s for ^ i.ntul interest i.ttn1
22.

1 M | IIF* r* • • > iini i

twenty-two
iiii

!

I! i 1 ^ .

" iterest on the November amounts past due twenty-one

m o n t h s for

total interest rate of __

_, _ percent comes v.w

$411.86.
23.

Interest on the December amounts past due twenty m o n t h s
-4-

/J7

f^- a total interest rate of 30 percent comes ti $272.59.
24.

Interest

•ru- January 27th invoice amounts past die
ii in

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1#

an award

of

$3,790.02 representing the amounts of the October, November and
December invoices as stipulated to by defendant at the beginning

2.

Plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of $785,1)

for the January 27th invoice outlining the inventory and goods
I ill

ill I mi i«l HI i iK1 I llij d e f e n d a n t t o p l a i n t i f f .

3.

This makes foi a total amount due and owing as a result

of w**w invoices defendant has failed to pay
4.

Plaintiffs

are further entitled

percent interest per annum as provided for

~-e i o
contract for

these amounts which are past due and owing.
5.

1

interest

calculated on the 60-day payment term

for each month totals
6.

As a result

t - i e ,'!""""• u"

I'" I111"" i", I *yi) .

the payment terms pursuant to the

contract were modified from a net-10 term where payment was due
the tenth c
owing were due sixty days later. This course of performance which
-5-

/JS

modified the contract under the Uniform Commercial Code, was of
nature where defendant would pay a mont

worth of invoices
plaintiff

prematurely

demanded

deliver the goods

payment

December

23rd

and

failed

breached its contract with defendant, aim
quidateci damages otherwise

provided for
7.

-he contract.

However, plaintiffs are entitled as the preva
compensal i on

I • i, their attorneys' fees and

costs.
8.

This Court has determined that

c

reason^

I". S I • "I ;i

ilaintiff

.

This

amount

reasonable and just and plaintiff as tine prevailing party
entitled to these amounts.
9.

Plaintiffs are further entitled

A

~ costs of court

of $93.00 as outlined in their memorandum of costs filed herewith.
10.
d i -111j

*

1
interest

Plaintiffs
,

1 1 1 t if I i in j

are
i in

therefo

,

Plaintiffs will

i

further entitled

post-judgment

percent per annu

a I I rimounts not paid from the date this judgment is signed by the
Court.

-6-

/S?

Dated this

MICHAEL L. HUTCHING!
Third Circuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify tha
I? AC 1 1 ! NE

of the foregoing FINDINGS OF

CONCLUSION

(Revised) were mailed,, postage

prepaid, this
U? /day of

Qj

0 dJl'jjfat-J.

1993 •

\\\v following:

Mark W. Dykes, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
1000 Reams Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84

Awu
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768)
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorney for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT

COUNTY

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

G & K SERVICES, INC., a
Corporation,

COMPLAINT

PlainI III,
PACIFIC BAT BAKING, a Utah
Corporation,
Civil K.
Judge
Defendant.

-pMf

The Plaintiff, ii k

K Services , inc., for complaint

against the Defendant above named alleges as follows:
'; ' 1.

3•

authorized to do business within the State of Utah.
The cause

action claim hereunder arose within
Defendants operate their business I :

the State of Utah.

3.
Defendants

On or about the 12th day of April, 1988, the

entered

into a Textile Leasing Service Agreement,

copies of which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A".
4.
cancelled

On

the

or

before

Agreement

January

mentioned

7,

1992, the

above

and

Defendant

therefore

is

responsible to pay liquidated damages as found in Paragraph 13
of the Agreement.
5. The Defendant has breached the agreement by their
actions in cancelling the agreement prematurely.
the

premature

cancellation,

the

Plaintiff

As a result of
is

entitled

to

liquidated damages as spelled out by the agreement in the amount
of $1,925.96.
6.

The

Defendant

has

also

breached

the

service

agreement by failing to make payments on account when due, and is
presently indebted to the Plaintiff, in the amount of $4,090.95,
for past due services rendered.
7.

Pursuant to the agreement between the parties, the

Defendant agreed to pay a reasonable attorney's fees and all
necessary costs incurred in remedying the default.

Said sums

shall be proved at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment

against the

defendant as follows:
1.

For liquidated damages in the amount of $1,925.96.
2

J

2.

For the amount of $4,090.95 for past due services

3.

For reasonable attorney's fees to be proven at

4.

For costs of Court and such other relief as the

rendered.

trial.

Court deems just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this

day of February, 1992.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

THEODORE E. KANELL
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
1671 South 4370 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84104
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EXHIBIT "A"

TEXTILE LEASING SERVICE AGREEMENT

(/

: u u L/ u u J
16/1 S O U T H 4 3 7 0 W E S T
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841

G^JC Services
^Textile Leasing Systems

13624

AE/U*.ftft$

SERVICE AGREEMENT.

[0039-01

Pacicif> Bay Baking
.. ("Customer") and Q&K SERVICES, U>
THIS IS AN AGREEMENT between
i though fufty set forth on this side
("Supplier") for the service described herein on the terms and conditions stated beiow and on the reverse side as
1. Agreement to Supply. Supplier agrees to supply and Customer agrees to accept exclusively from Supplier, during the term of this Agr
ment and any extensions or renewals hereof, all of Customer* requirements for the types of merchandise, equipment and services listed beiow at i
prices there stated. If Customer requests additional amounts or types of merchandise, equipment or serviced, such additional merchandise, eat
ment or services will be covered by this Agreement and u/tti be subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.
2. Prices* The prices and pricing method for Hems listed are stated below. Minimum or Rat rate charges are based upon total Inventory
stalled and are subject to chance If inventory increases or decreases. However, a decrease in the mmb€t of Customers employees wJM not decree
the weekly service charge unless an employee terminates his employment and Customer returns the fud number of garments issued to him.
1

"

'

•

"•"

•

"

IT6M DESCRIPTION
IshirL*

1

1. L«.J< »l

_1
]

u J 1 "

'

I

4 I ?

1

I

CHANGES
PER WEEK

OFPERSONS

WEEKLY CHARGE-]
.. PER CHANGE
•-"•[•so

1 Pants

Shoo

Jacket;
-

Towls

Terrv/Rib

Towels*

1

/.9f
.*>/*

1

ilO
J.SO
Jt/. tS

42" MOD'
Grill

Pad
1

36"

Mop

3 x 4

Mat;

4 x 6

Mat

iMitt
1

'•• •

-c»o
Lto
- A.z£
.07
•••• i / 7 *

I Coveralls
Lined

. 'TOTAL
WfeErCLY CHARGE

1

+'7>

Charges will be made for Draperation of additional orders, names,' emblems and seasonal chartqeovers,
•W
All prices are based on 55[weeks par year wanttce/
TOTAL
y

1

L i — M < —

'•'

J. •

n—mimmmmmm

II 1

1

I 1 I

3.

Supplier's Guarantee. Supplier guarantees that it will:
a, Repair and return to Customer, on the next scheduled delivery day, an garments in nood o! repair;
b. Return all merchandise in a useable condition;
a Return all merchandise picked UP for cleaning the following scheduled delivery day; and
d. Deliver in one week all addmen requesting standard size and color received on a regular delivery day.
If Supplier fails to meet the guarantees Hated abovo, Customer will be entitled to a credit equal to the weekly charge for the non-conforming item.
Supplier's failure to meet the above guarantees will not entitle Customer to cancel this Agreement
4. Effective Date, This Agraemonl takes effect as ot the date of signing. For new Customers of Supplier, the estimated date of first installation is
5. Price Increases, if Supplier^ costs of rendering services Increase during the term ot this Agreement or any renewal hereof, the priced of the
services may be revised. Supplier will give Customer notice of such price changes by Invoice or by statement or other wntten notice. Customer agrees
to accept such price changes so long as the changes do not represent an Increaae of more than 10% in the price of services being provided for any ona
year period. If such price increases do Axraed 10% in any one year ported and Customer deckle* not to accept the cnange, Customer agrees to so notify
supplier. If Customer so notifies Supplier, Supplier may, at Its sole option, either adjust the price Increase or cancel this Agreement.
THE UNDERSIGNED CUSTOMER UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THE TERMS OF 1HE SERVICE AGREEMENT PRINTED ABOVE AND ON THE REVERSE.
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^ A. Payment of Charges, Charges wiiLbe due and payable in cash at time of.deliver* on if Customer* credit is
orVJtye
Delinquent accounts « e subject
- - --* - — ~_«.^-. ___
..__. terflh day
. , . . of
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when due wiliT>e subject to a service charge to be added thereto of one and one-half percent (lVfe%) per month (18% annually) until:
7. J*m of Agreement This Agreement will continue until a date thirty-six (36) months from the date of first" installation '(for new'
Customers) or the date Customer signs a renewal contract (for renews Ouatomett*) (Um "fexplratton Date"), it will then be renewed automatically
for a period of one year unless written notice of non-renewal b given by either party to the dther atJeast sixty (60) days prior to the'Expiration Oate
* u/iless, spAy, (60jF
written notice
is given pnor tetany anniversary
Subsequent renewal will oocur automatically on a yearly basis.
~' days
*
" c*yion^sf\ewal
*
of the Expiration Date.

I.

8, Title to Merchandise* All merchandise and equipment provided to Customer under this Agreement will remain the.-property of
Supplier. Customer must return 'all merchandise when soiled to Supplier and may noj, perhw any' other person to clean or launder it .Customer
will be required to pay the depredated value'of all merchandise or equipment lost or damaged beyondrepair, (orojjnary. wear. and. (ear excepted)
during the course of the agreement or not returned to Supplier at terrnination of the Agrooment
• % »
.i • • ' , . . •
9. Depreciated Value. Depreciated value for the purpose of this Agreement will be determined by* deducting from Supplier's original
list price four percent (4%) per month down to a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of list price. .
.t - .
»- • •
10. SpecisUy»Pijrcha«»<! Merchandise, if Customer breaUie* 'mis Agreement or' gives notice of its termination, Customer agrees
to buy, upon demand of Supplier, all of the following specially-purchased merchandise In-service or-held in stock by-Supplier under this
Agreement at a price equal to its depreciated value as defined above. Customer * must pay tor such merchandise wlthm thirty (30) days of
Supplier's demand.
,,.-•*•
J
*.«.••*
ITEM

NUMBER OF PERSONS

CHANGES PER WEEK

TOTAL INVENTORY
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l o t Service.vSupplier win not be.tlable for
for ajry
aVry iinterruption of SuppdeVs Usual operattonlldrtlor Se/ay, postponeit. Interruptions
r
ment or termination or the service provided for in this Agreement by reason of acts of-God, strikes,- lockouts, or other Industrial disturbances,
wars, blockages, riots, arrests, .explosions, fires, floods, accidents to machinery or any other caueeAnpt within v^e^control of Supplier.
12. Customer Warranty. Customer warrants that it b not presently under contract with any other party for the - tokening of the
Items of services which are the subject matter of this .Agreement, and that this Agreement will itottcorisjriuie or result-in <Ji)e breach of
any contractual relationships to which Customer is a party of by which it is bound.
»
""• <"
13. Liquidated Damage* Upon Breach* The parties rooognice and agree that if Customer should broach this Agreement or terminate
this Agreement for any reason other than expressly permitted hereunder, the damages suffered by Supplier are not currently known or
ascertainable. Therefore, the parties agree that in the event of such breach pr wrongful termination, Customer will pay to Supplier as liquidated damages,
and not as a penalty; an amount equal to forty percent (40%) of the average weekly amounts invoiced to Customer multiplied by the number of weeks
remaining In the term of the Agreement, beginning with the date of breach, $uoh payments will be in addition to all other amounts owed by Customer
to supplier hereunder on the date of breach or wrongful termination.
!
14. Change In Customer's Location, Supplier* .obligation, to serve, and Customer's obligation ..to..accept-service will continue even
if Customer moves Its business to a different location, provided that the new location fa within Supplier^ route delivery area if Cuatonw
does business at mure than one location, me Items required at-each; location will/be^delrvered to each/ such* location. Customer may not
use any Items delivered to one location at any other location. ..",
, ~j
-^
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15. Costs and Attorney's Fees. Cu$Uxnor agrees to pay Supplier any costs of collection incurred by Supplier \n enforcing Customer*
nhtirjations under this Agreement, if Supplier must institute a feyai proceeding to collect Bny amount owing hereunder, then the unsuccessful
party in such legal proceeding must pay to the successful party its reasonable attorneys' fees.
16. No Warranty With Reaped to Merchandise, CUSTOMER ACKNOWLEDGES' ' T T W ' T H C ? GARMENTS RENTED r UNDER THIS
AGREEMENT ARE FOR GENERAL PURPOSES AND ARE' NOT-DESIGNED'. OR' RECOMMENDED FOR AREAS'OF FLAMMABILITY OR
WHEN CONTACT WITH HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OR IGNITION SOURCES IS POSSIBLE/SUPPLIER'IS NOT THE'MAKER OF THESE
GARMENTS AND HAS NOT MADE AND DOES NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR COVENANT, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
WITH RESPECT TO THE MERCHANTABIUTY FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -PURPOSE, QUALITY, 'SAFETY OR SUITABILITY' O F THE
GARMENTS FOR CUSTOMER USE. FXCFPT AS EXPRESSIY SET FORTH IN FAHAGnApi I 0 OF THIS AGREEMENT
.. .
,. M ,.;
17 Binding Agreement. This Agreement wilf be binding on 'and for* the benefit'of the'personal representative, • successors a n d 1
assigns of th© partiesnensto. ,.,
, {n . , N ( . „« . , » i < , i|nJ . »0 0,^ n,*r jo 5 f i foo*iO %+w •/v,o)oeis?'\ E-H1 .91* M r / r f v , ^ '•
t .,»
id Sevorabinty, tf any provision of thte Agreement is determined to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining terms
and conditions will,remain in.full force and effect.. .i«iM»ftrM ',{«•« nub «'• •*-w*i *• • VT*».J n.n"*W» to fipni ^iHiiqv,c* r .^u^in^m nr>nq <«
19. Entire Agreement This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and includes ail understsndlngs^between the parties. Me waivers
or-^i
Statements made by any representative of Supplier will be valid unless contained herein., .„*> .»,. ,{\ « \ >v,-k .* >
^ « •».,>' • jt».. k\ m
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
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